The Bank of England wants to scrap the annual check that 7,700 senior finance staff are fit for their jobs. Its own cost-benefit analysis prices the savings to the pound and calls the risk this creates merely limited, without a number attached.
Estimated reading time: 7 minutes
In short. CP14/26, the Prudential Regulation Authority's Phase 2 consultation on the Senior Managers and Certification Regime, published 22 October 2026, proposes abolishing the Certification Regime outright: no more annual fitness-and-propriety checks, certificates or regulatory references for the roughly 7,700 individuals it covers at PRA-regulated firms, 139,000 more at the FCA [1]. The case for removal rests on one sentence: "firms have clear incentives, underpinned by PRA rules, to ensure the competence and good conduct of their employees" [1]. The PRA's own cost-benefit chapter prices the savings to the pound and says they likely understate the true benefit, while the same chapter admits removal "could increase the risk of unsuitable appointments to roles that have a bearing on a firm's safety and soundness" and calls that risk merely "limited," with no figure attached [1]. Two documented mistakes: four stars.
Right now, a bank or insurer that wants to put someone into a senior but not board-level role, a key risk function, a material risk taker's seat, has to assess whether that person is fit and proper to hold it, repeat the assessment every year they stay in it, issue them a certificate confirming it, and ask their previous employer for a regulatory reference before hiring them at all. That is the Certification Regime, and under proposals published by the Bank of England's Prudential Regulation Authority on 22 October 2026, none of it would survive.
A regime built after 2008, offered back on trust
The Senior Managers and Certification Regime "was introduced in 2016 to strengthen individual accountability for the most senior decision makers in regulated firms," the PRA's own consultation paper states, and "draws on the lessons learned from the 2008 financial crisis" [1]. Phase 1 reforms, made in April 2026, already trimmed the regime. Phase 2, the PRA says, "would be the most significant reforms to the regime since its introduction" [1]. The headline change: "removing requirements related to the Certification Regime. Firms have clear incentives, underpinned by PRA rules, to ensure the competence and good conduct of their employees. The PRA is therefore proposing to remove the need to assess fitness and propriety both on appointment and annually thereafter for approximately 7,700 individuals that are within scope of the PRA Certification Regime" [1]. The FCA's parallel consultation, CP26/37, covers a far larger population: around 59,000 individuals holding Senior Manager Functions and 139,000 certified individuals across the whole of financial services [1] [2].
The whole package depends on legislation that does not yet exist. The PRA's own paper says these proposals "anticipate additional regulatory flexibility that would be provided by the Financial Services and Markets Bill 2026 (FSM Bill), if enacted," and that it would make the rule changes "once the relevant provisions in the FSM Bill have received Royal Assent and have been commenced but before those provisions are in effect" [1]. As of today, that Bill has cleared the Lords but has had only its first reading in the Commons; its second reading is listed for 10 November 2026, two days from now [3]. Committee stage, report stage, third reading and Royal Assent all still lie ahead. The PRA is not hiding this dependency, it states it plainly, and the consultation closes on 22 January 2027 with implementation pencilled in for the second half of 2027 [1]. But the scale of what is proposed is worth sitting with before the Bill has even had its second Commons reading: the end of a regime built specifically because, before 2016, firms' own incentives to police senior and risk-critical staff had not been enough.
The savings priced, the risk not
The PRA ran a real cost-benefit analysis, and it is precise about what firms would gain. "The PRA estimates that the Phase 2 proposals reduce annual costs from £24.8 million to £13.3 million across affected PRA firms, representing an annual reduction in burden of approximately £11.5 million, or 47% in the central estimate" [1]. Over ten years, "the present value of cost savings... is expected to be between £41.3 million and £201.4 million, with a central estimate of £101.5 million" [1]. The PRA goes further than precision: it says the number is probably too low. "The PRA considers that the quantified estimates are likely to understate the overall benefits of the proposals because several benefits are difficult to quantify" [1].
The same chapter is far less precise about the other side of the ledger. "Removal of the CR removes the regulatory requirements relating to F&P assessments for individuals subject to it. This could increase the risk of unsuitable appointments to roles that have a bearing on a firm's safety and soundness," the PRA states [1]. Its answer is a judgement, not a figure: "The PRA considers these risks to be limited because other requirements are in place, such as the Conduct Rules... the extension of the competent employee rule, and the PRA's ability to require firms to apply for pre-approval even if an SMF is designated as notified. Firms also have clear private incentives to appoint suitable senior staff" [1]. Nowhere in the chapter is that risk given a monetary value, a probability, or even a qualitative scale against the £101.5 million central estimate it sits beside. A chapter whose entire purpose is to weigh costs against benefits weighs one side in pounds and the other in adjectives.
This was not an oversight the PRA was left to spot alone. The regulator's own statutory Cost Benefit Analysis Panel reviewed the draft analysis before publication, and "the Panel suggested exploring the interaction between the Certification Regime and the Conduct Rules when considering the potential costs of removing the Certification Regime" [1]. The PRA's response was to add paragraph 6.44, the same "limited... because" passage quoted above [1]. The Panel asked for the risk to be explored; what it got was the risk asserted away.
What replaces the reference check
Certification is not the only thing going. The duty to seek a regulatory reference, the mechanism by which a firm hiring someone into one of these roles finds out from their previous employer whether there is a fitness or conduct problem on file, goes with it. The PRA's justification is a single sentence: "removing the need for regulatory references for individuals holding roles previously subject to the CR would reduce burden while still allowing firms to form a view on individual fitness drawing on a range of sources" [1]. The consultation does not say what those sources are, who is obliged to provide them, or whether any of them carries the same duty to respond that a regulatory reference request does today. A mandatory check with a named legal duty attached to it is replaced with an unspecified "range of sources" that no part of the document defines.
The claims, tested
| The document's own words | What the record actually shows | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| CP14/26 1.4: removing certification is safe because "firms have clear incentives, underpinned by PRA rules, to ensure the competence and good conduct of their employees" [1] | CP14/26 6.43-6.44: the PRA's own cost-benefit chapter admits removal "could increase the risk of unsuitable appointments" and answers only that the risk is "limited," with the figure for the savings (£101.5 million over 10 years) given to the pound and the figure for the risk given not at all [1] | The document's own cost-benefit analysis treats the certain side of the ledger with precision and the uncertain side with an unweighed assurance |
| CP14/26 4.6: removing the regulatory-reference duty still leaves firms "forming a view on individual fitness drawing on a range of sources" [1] | No part of the consultation names those sources, who must supply them, or whether any carry a duty to respond, the way a regulatory reference request does today [1] | A named legal duty is replaced with an undefined substitute |
Credit where due
This is a genuine consultation, not a decision dressed up as one. The PRA surveyed industry directly, 96 responses from dual-regulated firms including 44 banks and 23 insurers, and used that data, not guesswork, to build the cost estimates [1]. It submitted the draft analysis to its own statutory Cost Benefit Analysis Panel before publishing, and printed the Panel's specific challenges alongside its own responses in public, rather than only the parts that were flattering [1]. The PRA's own Practitioner Panel, representing the firms the regime binds, was consulted on every proposal and "showed strong support for the underlying regime," welcoming only the burden reduction, not a weakening of the regime's purpose [1]. And the PRA is candid about the limits of its own numbers: paragraph 6.26 flags reliance on self-reported survey data and a sample that overrepresents banks and underrepresents insurers and credit unions, asking readers to treat the findings with caution rather than presenting them as settled fact [1]. Trade commentary has already called this "the end of certification," and the PRA has not undersold what it is proposing [4].
Verdict
Four stars, from two documented mistakes. The PRA wants to abolish the Certification Regime for 7,700 of its own certified individuals, and relies for its safety case on a sentence asserting that firms' own incentives will do the job the regime was built to do after 2008. Its cost-benefit analysis prices the savings to the pound and will not put a number, or even a scale, on the risk it has itself admitted the removal creates. The reference check that today stops an unsuitable senior employee moving quietly from one firm to another is replaced with sources the consultation never names.
The star score counts two documented mistakes. First, CP14/26's cost-benefit analysis (paragraphs 6.43-6.44) admits that removing the Certification Regime "could increase the risk of unsuitable appointments to roles that have a bearing on a firm's safety and soundness," and answers only that the risk is "limited," with no monetary value, probability or scale given, while the savings side of the same analysis is quantified to the pound (paragraphs 6.47-6.48) and described as likely understated (paragraph 6.50). Second, paragraph 4.6 removes the mandatory regulatory-reference duty and replaces it with firms "drawing on a range of sources," a phrase the consultation never defines, naming no source, no obligation to respond, and no equivalent to the duty being removed. The dependence of these proposals on the Financial Services and Markets Bill, which has not yet had its Commons second reading, is reported above as context, not counted as a mistake: the PRA states the dependency plainly and has not acted as though the Bill were already law. Two falls in the 1 to 3 band: four stars; the bands are on the ratings page. This piece makes no finding about the personal conduct of any named individual; the claims tested are the regulators' own published words. All sources below were fetched directly on 8 November 2026.
Sources
- CP14/26 - Review of the SM&CR - Phase 2, Bank of England (Prudential Regulation Authority), published 22 October 2026, consultation closes 22 January 2027
- CP26/37 - Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR) Review: Phase 2, Financial Conduct Authority, published 22 October 2026
- Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL], record for Bill 4129, UK Parliament Bills API, accessed 8 November 2026
- The end of certification? The UK FCA and PRA unveil Phase 2 SMCR reforms, A&O Shearman, 29 October 2026