The FCA says banks have made good progress on operational resilience since March 2025. Its own report repeats the same untested dependency gap that froze five major banks' payments in July.
Estimated reading time: 6 minutes
In short. The FCA's 11 November 2026 findings on operational resilience open by saying "firms have made good progress since the operational resilience transition period ended in March 2025" [[1]]. The same document says some firms still "rely on assumptions about third party, group or shared service resilience without showing how they have tested or challenged those assumptions", and adds that "this theme was also raised in March 2026" [[1]]. Between the two reports, a shared payments fault froze transfers at Lloyds, Barclays, HSBC, Halifax and Monzo on the same afternoon [[5]]. The FCA's own disclosure log shows sector-wide operational and technology incidents rose from 407 in 2024 to 446 in 2025, the first full year after the transition period the good-progress claim covers [[3]]. Two documented mistakes: four stars.
The FCA has run two rounds of these good-and-poor-practice reviews. The first, published 27 March 2026, looked back at firms' self-assessments one year after the operational resilience rules in SYSC 15A finished their three-year transition. The second, published 11 November 2026, covers "firms' 2025 to 2026 operational resilience self-assessments" and says it "builds on" the March findings "but does not replace" them [[1]] [[2]]. Both are explicitly based on self-assessment review, not on independent testing of firms' systems or on a cross-check against the incidents firms are separately required to report.
The claim and the data that sits next to it
The November report's opening line is unambiguous: "Firms have made good progress since the operational resilience transition period ended in March 2025. We continue to see strong governance, mapping, testing and remediation arrangements across the sector" [[1]]. It is a sector-wide assessment, not a caveated one.
The FCA's own Freedom of Information disclosure on operational incidents, released 12 August 2026, tells a different story about the same sector over the same stretch of time. Retail banks reported 407 cyber, technology and non-technology incidents to the FCA in 2024. In 2025, the first full year after the transition period "ended", that total rose to 446, including a rise in technology incidents specifically from 382 to 422 [[3]]. The FCA's own commentary on the disclosure flags reporting delays and provisional figures, but the direction of travel in the regulator's own numbers is up, not down, in the very period the good-progress claim describes.
Individual firms' own disclosures do not contradict that picture. Barclays' published service-quality page records 13 major operational or security incidents reported to the FCA in the twelve months to 30 September 2026, 10 of them affecting internet banking [[4]]. Reporting a lower number than a rival bank, or than its own worse year, is not the same as the sector-wide "good progress" the November report asserts; the report does not reconcile its headline with either its own FOI data or firms' individual disclosures.
The gap that was already named
The sharper problem sits in the November report's section on mapping resources and dependency risk. It lists, as an example of poor practice still being seen: "Some firms rely on assumptions about third party, group or shared service resilience without showing how they have tested or challenged those assumptions." It then adds: "This theme was also raised in March 2026" [[1]]. The March 2026 report said, under its own "areas for improvement": "There is more work to do on identifying, assessing and remediating third party vulnerabilities" [[2]].
That is the FCA naming the same unresolved weakness twice, eight months apart. In between, on the afternoon of 28 July 2026, a fault in the UK's shared Faster Payments infrastructure froze transfers simultaneously at Lloyds, Barclays, HSBC, Halifax and Monzo. Lloyds told customers: "We're investigating an issue affecting Faster Payments, which may cause delays. If you've already made a payment, please don't send it again." Monzo said: "We're aware of an issue that is temporarily causing issues" [[5]]. More than 1,000 cumulative reports piled up on Downdetector within hours before the issue was resolved that afternoon [[5]].
Whatever the precise technical cause, five customer-facing banks going down together from a shared dependency is exactly the scenario the FCA's own "poor practice" line describes: a dependency whose resilience firms assumed rather than tested. The November report treats the gap as a continuing theme to monitor. It does not mention that the theme had, in the meantime, produced a live outage affecting millions of customers of five different banks on one afternoon.
Credit where due
The FCA is not hiding the repetition. Saying outright that a named weakness "was also raised in March 2026" is more candid than most regulators manage, and the FOI disclosure that undercuts the good-progress line is the FCA's own voluntary release, not something prised out under pressure. The report is also honest about its own method: it calls its findings "observations", not new rules, and says plainly that they come from reviewing self-assessments rather than from independent testing. The problem is not concealment. It is that the headline framing, read on its own, promises more than the regulator's own evidence, a few paragraphs and one FOI release later, actually supports.
The claims, tested
| The document's own words | What the record shows | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| "Firms have made good progress since the operational resilience transition period ended in March 2025" (Nov 2026 report) [[1]] | The FCA's own FOI disclosure shows sector-wide operational and technology incidents rose from 407 (2024) to 446 (2025), the first full year after the transition period ended [[3]] | The regulator's own incident count does not show the improvement the headline claims |
| "Some firms rely on assumptions about third party, group or shared service resilience without showing how they have tested or challenged those assumptions... This theme was also raised in March 2026" (Nov 2026 report, repeating a line from the March 2026 report) [[1]] [[2]] | A shared payments-infrastructure fault froze transfers at five major banks simultaneously on 28 July 2026, in the gap between the two reports [[5]] | The untested dependency the FCA flagged twice was not a hypothetical risk; it produced a real, multi-bank outage, and the November report does not connect the two |
Sources
- FCA, Operational resilience: demonstrating resilience in practice, 11 November 2026
- FCA, Operational resilience: insights and observations, one year on, 27 March 2026
- FCA, Information on major operational incidents reported by retail banks, 12 August 2026 (FOI2026/01239)
- Barclays, Information about our current account services (service quality disclosure)
- FStech, Payment outages affect users of banks including Lloyds and HSBC, 28 July 2026