TEARDOWN Published 15 November 2026 at 02:45. Evidence-based. Source-cited. No sponsored content.

The Environment Agency credits sustained investment with protecting 167,000 properties during recent storms. Its own new modelling of that same spending shows flood damage will keep rising for decades, not fall.

4 out of 5 stars4/52 documented mistakes in this teardownHow ratings work

Estimated reading time: 6 minutes

A pedestrian underpass completely submerged by floodwater at Hengrove, Bristol, after heavy rain overwhelmed drainage.
A flooded underpass at Hengrove, Bristol, 25 December 2021. Photo: Nigel Mykura / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0.

In short. The Environment Agency's Long-Term Investment Scenarios (LTIS) 2026 report, published 13 November 2026, opens by saying flood defences "protected around 167,000 properties" during the storms of winter 2024 to 2025, and that this "demonstrate[s] the substantial benefits provided through sustained government investment" [1]. The same report's own Section 3.6 confirms that current government spending on flood and coastal risk management, around £1.3 to £1.4 billion a year, matches what it calls the "30% investment scenario" [1]. Its own Section 5 modelling shows that under that same scenario, overall flood damage still rises to 1.4 times present-day levels within 50 years, and surface water flood damage rises to 2.1 times present-day levels, barely better than the 2.2 times projected if nothing at all were spent [1]. Two documented mistakes: four stars.

Long-Term Investment Scenarios is the Environment Agency's own economic model of what different levels of flood and coastal spending buy over the next 50 and 100 years, first produced in 2009 and updated roughly every five years since. The 2026 edition, published 13 November, is "a major step forward" on the 2019 version, built on updated flood risk maps, current cost data and the latest UK climate projections, and it now also estimates the social and natural capital benefits of investment, not just the economic ones [1]. It is not a spending announcement. The report says so itself: "LTIS does not assess where the funding would come from or which funding sources would be most appropriate" [1]. It is the evidence base the government says it uses to set that funding.

What the report leads with

Section 2, "Context for flood and coastal investment", opens with scale: around 6.3 million properties in England are currently in areas at risk of flooding from rivers, the sea or surface water, rising to around 8 million, or one in four properties, by mid-century [1]. It then turns to what investment has already achieved. During the seven named storms of winter 2024 to 2025, "around 5,000 properties were reported as flooded. At the same time flood and coastal defences protected around 167,000 properties across the country. These avoided impacts demonstrate the substantial benefits provided through sustained government investment" [1]. The same section adds that the 2015 to 2021 programme "better protected more than 300,000 properties", and "a further 150,000 properties have benefited" since 2021 [1].

Nothing in that section is false. Properties really were protected, and the figures are specific rather than rounded away. But Section 2 also contains the report's own warning about reading those numbers forward: "the level of flood risk reduction achieved is unlikely to remain constant over the long term", because climate change increases the frequency and severity of flooding while existing defences "naturally deteriorate and age over time" [1]. That warning is the hinge the rest of the report turns on, three sections later, with numbers attached.

What the same report's own modelling shows

Section 3.6 states plainly what the government is actually spending: "Current government investment in FCERM is around £1.3 to £1.4bn per year", made up of £2.65 billion across the two years to March 2026 and £4.2 billion over the three years to March 2029 [1]. The report then places that figure directly against its own named scenarios: "30% investment scenario - broadly similar to the current level of investment" and "60% investment scenario - around double the current investment level" [1].

Section 5.1 then reports what that current spending level buys over time. "Under the 30% investment scenario, over 50 years, damages from surface water flooding are around 2.1 times present-day levels" [1]. Table 6 gives the equivalent figure for damage from all sources of flooding combined at the same spending level: 1.4 times present-day levels over 50 years, and 2.3 times over 100 years [1]. Even doubling the spend to the 60% scenario only holds overall damage "broadly able to maintain overall flood damages at around present-day levels" for 25 years, before damage resumes growing: "over the next 50 years... overall damages increase to around 1.1 times present-day levels" [1]. None of this appears in Section 2's account of what investment "demonstrates".

The scenario that barely beats doing nothing

Surface water flooding gets the starkest number in the report, and it sits specifically against the "do nothing" baseline the report also models. Under the current, 30% spending level, the report projects surface water damage will reach 2.1 times present-day levels within 50 years. Under a "do nothing" scenario, defined as no investment beyond the "essential health and safety maintenance required to keep existing flood and coastal defences safe", the same measure of surface water damage reaches 2.2 times present-day levels over the same period [1]. A full decade of government spending on flood and coastal risk management, at the level the government is actually spending, buys a 0.1-times difference against spending essentially nothing, for the one source of flooding the report itself says will "increasingly depend" on investment because of "increasing rainfall intensity and growing pressure on urban drainage systems" [1]. The report states the gap is narrow; it does not say so anywhere in its own framing of what current investment achieves.

The claims, tested

The report's own words What its own later sections show Verdict
"Flood and coastal defences protected around 167,000 properties across the country... these avoided impacts demonstrate the substantial benefits provided through sustained government investment" (Section 2) [1] Section 3.6 confirms current spending matches the "30% investment scenario"; Section 5.1 and Table 6 show that scenario still lets overall damage rise to 1.4 times present-day levels over 50 years [1] Current spending is described as protective with no mention that the same report's own modelling has damage rising at that spending level
Current investment is said to deliver "substantial benefits" against surface water flooding among other sources (Section 2) [1] Section 5.2: at current (30%) spending, surface water damage reaches 2.1 times present-day levels over 50 years, against 2.2 times under "do nothing" [1] Current spending on surface water flooding specifically achieves almost the same long-term outcome as spending nothing

Credit where due

LTIS 2026 is unusually transparent about its own limits, and that transparency is consistent throughout rather than a token caveat. It states outright that it does not assess where funding would come from, does not account for delivery capacity such as skilled workers or available land, and does not reflect government policy preferences [1]. For the first time, the report quantifies its own uncertainty rather than presenting single numbers as certain: a 70% chance the modelled net present value sits within plus or minus 60% of the figures given, and similar ranges for benefits and costs [1]. The modelling behind it went through what the report calls "an exceptionally high level of both internal and independent scrutiny", with more than 100 experts reviewing individual topic areas and nine independent technical experts feeding into an overall review [1]. And the report does not hide its own bad news for surface water and coastal flooding behind an optimistic summary; Section 5.2 states plainly that fluvial flooding is "the only source of flood risk where sustained optimised investment can reduce damages below present-day levels over the long term", a direct, unflattering admission about the other two sources, published in the same document [1].

Verdict

Four stars, from two documented mistakes. This is a methodologically serious piece of modelling, built with real independent scrutiny and published with its own uncertainty attached, not a document built to flatter current policy. The gap is between its opening framing, where past and present spending "demonstrate the substantial benefits provided through sustained government investment", and its own later modelling, which shows that the spending level actually being delivered still lets flood damage grow for decades, and barely outperforms doing nothing at all against the fastest-growing source of flood risk. A reader who stops at Section 2 would not learn either fact.

The star score counts two documented mistakes. First, the report's Section 2 credits "sustained government investment" with protecting 167,000 properties and demonstrating "substantial benefits", without noting that its own Section 3.6 and Section 5 confirm the spending level actually being delivered, the 30% scenario, still lets overall flood damage rise to 1.4 times present-day levels within 50 years. Second, the same framing extends to surface water flooding specifically, where the report's own Section 5.2 shows that spending at the current level reaches 2.1 times present-day damage over 50 years, against 2.2 times if nothing were spent at all, a gap the report states in its own numbers but never flags in its own summary of what investment achieves. Two falls in the 1 to 3 band: four stars; the bands are on the ratings page. This piece makes no finding about the accuracy of any individual flood risk assessment, the conduct of any named individual, or whether a different spending level than those modelled would be deliverable in practice, none of which this piece independently tested. The source was fetched and verified live on 15 November 2026.

Sources

  1. Long-term investment scenarios (LTIS) 2026, Environment Agency, published 13 November 2026
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