TEARDOWN Published 15 November 2026 at 06:45. Evidence-based. Source-cited. No sponsored content.

The FCA wants to exempt performance fees from the cap built to shield pension savers from unfair charges. Its own sums say that could cost savers up to £936m a year, with success checked only from 2028.

4 out of 5 stars4/52 documented mistakes in this teardownHow ratings work

Estimated reading time: 7 minutes

12 Endeavour Square, the Financial Conduct Authority's headquarters in Stratford, east London, seen from an upper floor of a neighbouring tower.
12 Endeavour Square, Stratford, the Financial Conduct Authority's headquarters since 2018, 15 April 2026. Photo: Yirba / Wikimedia Commons, CC0.

In short. The Financial Conduct Authority's consultation CP26/40, published 12 November 2026, proposes exempting certain performance fees from the 0.75% charge cap that limits what workplace default pension schemes can charge savers, a cap that exists "because employers may have limited ability to influence the charges applied to their employees' pension savings" [1] (page 3). The new valuation safeguards meant to stop that exemption being abused rest on "findings from the FCA's recent multi-firm review" of private markets conflicts of interest [1] (page 20), a review this site has already shown discloses no sample size or market-coverage figure for its own findings [2]. The consultation's own cost-benefit analysis estimates savers will pay £452m to £936m a year in the fees the exemption unlocks [1] (page 29), while its "Measuring success" annex sets no baseline, no numeric target and no date for checking the outcome beyond a Value for Money Framework "due to be implemented from 2028" [1] (page 71). Two documented mistakes: four stars.

A charge cap is a blunt instrument by design. Introduced in 2015, it limits what a workplace pension scheme's default fund can charge a saver who never actively chose that fund, to 0.75% of the money under management a year. The point of a blunt instrument is that it does not bend for a persuasive case. CP26/40, the Financial Conduct Authority's consultation published 12 November 2026, asks whether this one should bend anyway, to let default funds pay performance fees to private equity, venture capital and private credit managers without breaching the cap. The FCA thinks the case is good enough. Its own numbers, read carefully, do not fully back that up.

The cap, and why it exists

The consultation is honest about the cap's purpose, because it has to quote its own rulebook to explain what it is proposing to carve an exception into. "The charge cap was introduced because employers may have limited ability to influence the charges applied to their employees' pension savings and to ensure all savers would benefit from lower charges" [1] (page 3). Most savers in a workplace default fund never chose it, and their employer, who did choose it, had little reason to negotiate hard on fees paid by someone else's pension pot. The cap substitutes for that missing negotiation. CP26/40 now proposes exempting certain performance fees from it for FCA-regulated contract-based schemes, following DWP's 2023 exemption for trust-based schemes, "where this is in savers' best interests" [1] (page 3). The proposal is "permissive rather than mandatory" [1] (page 6): no scheme has to use the exemption, but any that does is testing, fee by fee, the exact judgement the cap was built to take out of their hands.

The safeguard that leans on an unmeasured review

Because the exemption is permissive, the consultation's real protection for savers sits in Chapter 6's due diligence requirements: before investing, a scheme operator "must establish on reasonable grounds that appropriate policies and procedures are in place for the valuation of the managed investments," and if it cannot, "the operator must not proceed with making the investment" [1] (page 20). This is the mechanism meant to stop a fund manager inflating a valuation to trigger a bigger performance fee. Explaining where this framework came from, the FCA states: "In designing these requirements, we have considered findings from the FCA's recent multi-firm review and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Recommendations on Valuing Collective Investment Schemes" [1] (page 20). One of the specific conflict risks it flags, drawn from that same review, is "manager-led transactions such as continuation vehicles or other situations where managers sit on both sides of transactions or have incentives to elevate fees" [1] (page 21).

The review being leaned on is the FCA's own 23 October 2026 multi-firm review of conflicts of interest in private markets, torn down on this site three weeks ago for a specific, documented gap: it never says how many firms took part in its questionnaire, how many were visited, or what share of a market "approaching £1.2 trillion" they represent [2]. Its own March 2025 sibling review, using near-identical methodology language, gave that number without being asked: a sample of 36 firms covering around £3 trillion of global assets. The conflicts review gave no equivalent figure. CP26/40 now treats that review's findings as solid enough ground to design a valuation governance framework protecting savers' money, without the underlying consultation ever stating, or apparently needing to know, how representative the findings it relies on actually are.

What the FCA's own cost-benefit analysis actually says

The consultation does not hide the cost to savers; it states it. Annex 2's Table 3 credits savers with an annualised benefit of £819m to £1,155m from improved investment performance, and separately records that the same savers pay £452m to £936m a year in "fee payments from savers to asset managers" to generate it [1] (page 29). Set against each other, in the worst case on the FCA's own ranges, the fee bill very nearly matches the gain. The FCA's central estimate across the whole 10-year appraisal is a net present value of £8.8bn built on an expected 2.1% uplift in median net returns [1] (page 28), but that is a portfolio-wide modelled average, not a guarantee for any individual saver whose fund underperforms. The same cost-benefit analysis includes an illustrative case study acknowledging that, under the existing cap, "breaches occur in around 22% of simulations" [1] (page 34): a cap that the FCA's own modelling shows would bite in nearly a quarter of scenarios is not an edge case being tidied up, it is a protection that was doing something in a material share of outcomes.

Against that scale of cost and uncertainty, the consultation's own account of how it will know whether the exemption worked is thin. Annex 4, "Measuring success," states that if the proposal "has its intended effect, we expect to see: use of the charge cap exemption, increased private market allocations, improved net outcomes for savers, where investments perform as expected" [1] (page 71). The third of those three indicators is circular: savers benefit if investments perform as expected, which is simply restating the hoped-for result as its own measure. No baseline figure, no numeric target and no date is set for assessing it, beyond a note that "the Value for Money Framework, due to be implemented from 2028, will allow performance to be reviewed over time" [1] (page 71). Final rules are expected summer 2027, a year before the framework meant to judge them exists.

The claims, tested

The consultation's own words What its own text actually shows Verdict
The charge cap exists "because employers may have limited ability to influence the charges applied to their employees' pension savings" [1] (page 3) The same consultation's own modelling shows the cap would be breached "in around 22% of simulations" under current rules [1] (page 34), evidence the protection is live in a material share of cases, not a technicality
New valuation due diligence rules will stop performance fees being inflated, built on "findings from the FCA's recent multi-firm review" [1] (page 20) That review discloses no sample size or market-coverage figure for its own findings, unlike its 2025 sibling review of the same sector, which gave both exactly [2] A safeguard framework built on evidence of unstated scope
"If the proposal has its intended effect, we expect to see... improved net outcomes for savers, where investments perform as expected" [1] (page 71) No baseline, target or date is set for this measure; review is deferred to a Value for Money Framework "due to be implemented from 2028" [1] (page 71), a year after final rules take effect A success measure that cannot be checked until well after the policy is live

Credit where due

The FCA does not bury the cost of its own proposal. Table 3 states plainly that savers would pay £452m to £936m a year in fees, set directly against the £819m to £1,155m they are expected to gain, rather than quoting only the net headline figure. The consultation also admits a genuine limit on its own case for intervention: "the charge cap may not be the primary obstacle to achieving the MHA investment allocations" [1] (page 28), a concession that undercuts its own rationale rather than inflating it. And on at least one open question, the FCA says plainly that it has not yet worked out an answer, inviting feedback on how to define which costs fall inside the cap rather than pretending the definition is already settled [1] (page 6). That is more candour than this site often finds in a consultation paper.

Verdict

Four stars, from two documented mistakes. A consultation is allowed to propose loosening a rule if the evidence supports it, and the FCA's own modelling does show a plausible route to better returns for savers who end up in well-run funds. What it should not do is build the safeguard meant to stop that going wrong on a review it has not itself made legible, and call a policy measured when the framework meant to measure it will not exist until a year after the rules take effect. Savers get a number for what they might pay. They do not get a date for finding out whether it was worth it.

The star score counts two documented mistakes. First, CP26/40's proposed valuation governance due diligence framework (Chapter 6, pages 20-21) explicitly draws on "findings from the FCA's recent multi-firm review" of private markets conflicts of interest, a review this site has already shown discloses no sample size or assets-under-management coverage figure, unlike its own March 2025 sibling review of the same sector. Second, the consultation's own cost-benefit analysis (Annex 2, page 29) shows savers paying £452m to £936m a year in the fees the exemption unlocks, while its "Measuring success" annex (Annex 4, page 71) sets no baseline, numeric target or date for checking the outcome beyond a Value for Money Framework "due to be implemented from 2028," a year after the FCA's own expected summer 2027 start date for final rules. Two falls in the 1 to 3 band: four stars; the bands are on the ratings page. This piece makes no finding about whether private market investment itself is suitable for pension default funds, about the accuracy of the FCA's Monte Carlo modelling assumptions, or about DWP's separate 2023 exemption for trust-based schemes, none of which this piece independently tested. The source was fetched and verified live on 15 November 2026.

Sources

  1. CP26/40: Exempting performance fees from the workplace pensions charge cap, Financial Conduct Authority, published 12 November 2026
  2. Conflicts of interest and fair customer treatment in private markets, Financial Conduct Authority, published 23 October 2026
  3. File:12 Endeavour Square, Stratford (2026-04-15).jpg, Wikimedia Commons, photo by Yirba, 15 April 2026
  4. Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication
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