The Payment Systems Regulator insists its new access rules create no new obligations for industry. Three pages later its own consultation names the two firms gaining one anyway: Mastercard and the LINK cash machine network.
Estimated reading time: 7 minutes
In short. CP26/3, published by the Payment Systems Regulator on 15 October 2026, proposes a single replacement for the UK's patchwork of payment systems access rules ahead of the PSR's planned abolition [1]. Its own list of "What we are not proposing" states that the PSR is not "proposing new or expanded access obligations" [1], page 9, with a footnote on the same page carving out one exception as "minor" without saying what it is. Three pages later, the consultation names it: Mastercard and LINK, the scheme connecting the UK's cash machines, would for the first time have to publish their access rules, a duty they do not have today [1], pages 11 to 12. Two paragraphs after deciding against a formal cost-benefit analysis because any cost increase would be "minimal," the same document admits that exact change is an uncosted "scoping difference" it will only "account for... in any final proposals" [1], pages 14 to 15. Two documented mistakes: four stars.
Withdraw cash from a machine that is not run by your own bank, and the transaction almost certainly passes through LINK, the scheme that lets one bank's customers use another's cash machines across the country. Pay with a Mastercard-branded card, and the payment passes through the other of two firms a financial regulator's own consultation paper names, deep in its text, as about to gain a duty that regulator insists, in the same document's executive summary, nobody is gaining.
A regulator writing its own obituary
The Payment Systems Regulator is being abolished. In April 2026, HM Treasury published its response to an earlier consultation, confirming that "the government intends to proceed with consolidating the PSR functions entirely within the FCA," including by "providing the FCA powers in relation to payment systems that are broadly equivalent in scope and substance to those exercisable by the PSR," and separately that "the government also intends to proceed with its proposal for simplifying the access regime for payment systems" [4]. CP26/3 is the PSR's attempt to tidy up the access rules it currently administers before those powers transfer to the Financial Conduct Authority [1], page 3.
Access to payment systems, in the PSR's own framing, is currently governed through three separate vehicles: regulations 102 to 104 of the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (PSRs 2017), which cover most systems; General Direction 2 (GD2), which covers systems not caught by the PSRs 2017; and General Direction 3 (GD3), a lighter regime for the systems that are caught by the PSRs 2017 [1], pages 4 to 5. HM Treasury plans to revoke the PSRs 2017 provisions, so CP26/3 proposes folding everything into a single revised GD2 [1], page 7. The PSR's own framing is one of continuity, not change: "we propose to update PSR General Direction (GD) 2, revoke GD3, and update relevant PSR guidance," intending for "the existing substantive access requirements... to remain" [1], page 3 and page 6.
The list that leaves something out
Section 2.4 of CP26/3 sets out, in a short bulleted list headed "What we are not proposing," exactly what this consultation does not touch: "this consultation does not propose a reconsideration of the overall policy framework governing access. In particular, we are not: undertaking a wider review of the POND criteria; proposing new or expanded access obligations" [1], page 9. POND is the PSR's own shorthand for the underlying standard, that access be granted on a proportionate, objective and non-discriminatory basis [1], page 4.
A footnote attached to that second bullet reads, in full: "This is except for the procedural requirement outlined at paras 2.17-2.21, which we consider minor" [1], page 9. The footnote does not say what that procedural requirement is. A reader relying on the bulleted summary, the part of the document written to be skimmed, would come away believing nothing new is being asked of anyone.
What the footnote was pointing at
Three pages on, paragraph 2.18 explains what "publicly disclosed access requirements" currently means under GD2: an operator must, "at the least," provide a copy of its access requirements "in a prominent, easily accessible position on any relevant website that the operator operates or controls" [1], page 11. The current General Direction 2 confirms the same wording independently: paragraph 3.2 of GD2 (2020) defines publicly disclosing access requirements in near-identical terms [2].
Paragraph 2.19 then states the gap: "Currently, there is no equivalent provision for operators who fall in scope of GD3, including Mastercard and LINK" [1], page 11. The current General Direction 3 confirms this independently too: its operative paragraphs require only that an operator notify the PSR of changes to its access requirements and submit an annual compliance report, with no publication duty at all [3]. Paragraph 2.20 of CP26/3 then proposes the fix: "this change restores consistency by requiring all operators of regulated payment systems to publish clearly available rules disclosing access requirements. This requirement would again be applied to all operators, including Mastercard and LINK, who are currently not obligated to publish rules" [1], page 12.
That is a new obligation, stated in the PSR's own words, on two named and systemically significant firms: one of the two major card schemes used across the UK, and the scheme that connects the country's cash machine network. It sits inside the very paragraph range the "what we are not proposing" footnote excused as "minor," without that word, new, ever appearing in the bulleted summary readers are likelier to rely on.
A cost-benefit analysis skipped before the sums were done
A second gap sits in how CP26/3 justifies skipping its own normal process. Paragraph 2.36 states: "We are not including a formal cost benefit analysis with the draft revised GD2. Although there is generally a requirement to do so when proposing to give a general direction, we consider that under our proposed approach, there will either be no increase in costs or any increase will be of minimal significance" [1], page 14.
Two paragraphs later, paragraph 2.38 lists two "scoping differences" the PSR says it has not yet accounted for: the second is "those regulated payment system operators previously covered by GD3 will be required to have publicly accessible access requirements, bringing consistency with the position for FSBRA-designated operators subject to current GD2" [1], page 15, the same Mastercard and LINK change again, which the PSR says it "will account for in any final proposals" [1], page 15. The claim that costs will be "minimal" and the admission that the costs of this specific change have not yet been worked out sit two paragraphs apart in the same document.
The claims, tested
| The document's own words | What the record shows | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| "We are not: undertaking a wider review of the POND criteria; proposing new or expanded access obligations" [1], page 9, with a footnote excusing "paras 2.17-2.21" as "minor" | Paragraphs 2.18 to 2.20 of the same document propose requiring Mastercard and LINK to publicly disclose access requirements for the first time, a duty confirmed absent from both currently in force (GD2 and GD3) [1] [2] [3] | A new obligation on two named, systemically significant firms is real; only the footnote, not the summary bullet, admits it |
| "We consider that under our proposed approach, there will either be no increase in costs or any increase will be of minimal significance" [1], page 14 | Two paragraphs later, the same change is listed as an uncosted "scoping difference... which we will account for in any final proposals" [1], page 15 | The minimal-cost conclusion precedes the costing of the one change most likely to carry a real cost for the firms newly caught by it |
Credit where due
The substance of what is being proposed is not hidden from anyone who reads past the summary. Question 2 of the consultation asks outright: "Do you agree with our proposal to make all operators publicly disclose their access requirements? Please give reasons" [1], page 12, and the paragraphs around it describe the change in plain terms, naming Mastercard and LINK directly rather than hiding them behind "certain operators" or similar. The PSR also notes, fairly, that the change has a precedent: "the previous GD3, which was in force from 2016 to 2020, did include a requirement that the requirements be publicly available across all operators" [1], page 11, so this is closer to restoring a lapsed rule than inventing one from nothing. The PSR further notes that Mastercard already publishes its access requirements voluntarily, despite no obligation to do so, which narrows the practical gap for one of the two named firms [1], page 12. This remains a consultation, not a final rule, and comments close at 5pm on 10 December 2026, leaving time for LINK, Mastercard or anyone else to make the case the PSR has got the costs or the framing wrong.
Verdict
Four stars, from two documented mistakes. The underlying policy, a single, simplified access regime ahead of the PSR folding into the FCA, is a reasonable response to a real legislative change, and nothing here suggests the PSR is trying to sneak the substance of the Mastercard and LINK change past stakeholders who read the actual consultation questions. But a document's executive summary is written for readers who will not get to paragraph 2.18, and that summary's own "what we are not proposing" list says something the same document's footnotes and later paragraphs do not support. A regulator that can name the two firms gaining a new duty, on page 12, can name that duty in its own list of exceptions on page 9.
The star score counts two documented mistakes. First, CP26/3's "What we are not proposing" list (paragraph 2.4, page 9) states that the PSR is not "proposing new or expanded access obligations," with a footnote excusing the procedural requirement at paragraphs 2.17 to 2.21 as "minor" without naming it; paragraphs 2.18 to 2.20 (pages 11 to 12) then propose requiring Mastercard and LINK to publicly disclose their access requirements for the first time, confirmed as a genuinely new duty by the current General Direction 2 and General Direction 3, neither of which currently requires it of them. Second, paragraph 2.36 (page 14) states that skipping a formal cost-benefit analysis is justified because any cost increase "will be of minimal significance," while paragraph 2.38 (page 15), two paragraphs later, lists the same Mastercard and LINK change as an uncosted "scoping difference" the PSR "will account for in any final proposals." Two falls in the 1 to 3 band: four stars; the bands are on the ratings page. This piece makes no finding about the conduct of any named individual; the drafting choices examined are institutional. All five sources below were fetched directly on 9 November 2026; none returned an error.
Sources
- CP26/3: Regulatory framework for access to payment systems (PDF), Payment Systems Regulator, published 15 October 2026
- General Direction 2: Access (FSBRA) (2020), Payment Systems Regulator
- General Direction 3: Access (PSRs 2017) (2020), Payment Systems Regulator
- A Streamlined Approach to Payment Systems Regulation: Consultation response, HM Treasury, updated 21 April 2026