TEARDOWN Published 13 November 2026 at 06:44. Evidence-based. Source-cited. No sponsored content.

The government says it has fixed a "fragmented" approach to forced labour in supply chains. Its own fix splits the country into two different legal regimes and names no regulator to enforce either one.

4 out of 5 stars4/53 documented mistakes in this teardownHow ratings work

Estimated reading time: 7 minutes

Aerial view of the DP World container terminal at the Port of Southampton, with rows of stacked shipping containers, gantry cranes and two container ships at berth.
The DP World container terminal, Port of Southampton, 20 September 2026, the kind of dockside the government's new forced-labour goods-removal power would have to reach. Photo: Tim Sheerman-Chase / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0.

In short. A written ministerial statement on 4 November 2026 announces the outcome of the government's Responsible Business Conduct review: a new mandatory human rights due diligence regime for large businesses, and a power to pull goods made with forced labour off the Great Britain market [1]. The statement says "a regulator will be empowered" to use that power, without naming one anywhere in its text [1], and the body the government's own Trade Strategy said would take on exactly this role, the "Office for Responsible Business Conduct" [2], does not appear once. Three documented mistakes: four stars.

A fragmented framework, fixed with two framework

The statement opens with a diagnosis. "In our review, we found the UK's current framework for preventing forced labour to be fragmented and overly reliant on voluntary action and reporting measures," Secretary of State Jonathan Reynolds told the House of Commons [1]. The Modern Slavery Act 2015, he said, was "world leading at the time of its introduction" but "international standards and legislative practice have since moved on leaving the UK out-of-step with G7 partners and other major trading economies" [1].

The fix announced is a new mandatory human rights due diligence regime: businesses with a global turnover above £350 million, and non-UK businesses with UK-generated turnover above £350 million, will have to "identify, assess and address risks of human rights abuses and labour exploitation" in their own operations and supply chains [1]. Alongside it comes a goods-removal power: "we will introduce powers to be able to remove goods made with forced labour from the Great Britain market. A regulator will be empowered to investigate businesses suspected of placing such goods on the market and, where due diligence obligations have not been met and forced labour is identified, direct their withdrawal" [1].

That regime does not cover the whole United Kingdom the same way. "In Northern Ireland, we will apply the EU's Forced Labour Regulation (EUFLR) under the Windsor Framework. Both regimes ensure goods made with forced labour can be withdrawn from the market and aim to deliver a similar effect in practice," the statement says [1]. A diagnosis of fragmentation is answered with two separate legal regimes, run by two separate authorities, applying two separate sets of rules, in one country. "A similar effect in practice" is the statement's own words for that outcome; it is asserted once, in one clause, with no comparison of the two regimes' thresholds, timelines or enforcement routes to back it up.

The office that was supposed to do this job

The review's origin matters here. The government's Trade Strategy, published in June 2025, is where the Responsible Business Conduct review was first promised: "We will launch a review of our approach to ensuring responsible business conduct, focusing on the global supply chains of businesses operating in the UK" [2]. On the same page, the Trade Strategy named the body meant to carry that work: "We are refreshing the UK's National Contact Point, responsible for the promotion of the OECD Guidelines on RBC. This includes updating its name to the Office for Responsible Business Conduct to more accurately reflect the mission and improve its visibility with industry" [2]. The Trade Strategy said the renamed office "will continue to sit within DBT and provide a single front door to UK businesses, trade unions and civil society" [2].

Seventeen months later, the statement reporting what that review found does not mention the Office for Responsible Business Conduct, or the National Contact Point it was meant to replace, at all. The goods-removal power is handed to "a regulator" [1], a phrase that appears twice in the statement and is never once attached to a name. Readers are left unable to tell whether the office the government already said it was building has been given this job, shelved, or simply not decided yet.

A date withheld, after a minister had already given one

The statement's only words on timing are these: "We will work closely with stakeholders on the design and implementation of these measures and introduce them as soon as parliamentary time allows" [1]. No bill is named. No session is named. No year is named.

Four months earlier, the government's own Minister of State for Trade had already put a boundary on that silence. Giving evidence to the Business and Trade Committee on 30 June 2026, Chris Bryant said he "would be absolutely amazed and demoralised and upset if we haven't managed to introduce some kind of forced labor ban by the end of this Parliament", due to run to August 2029 [3]. Asked why a firmer date was not on offer there and then, Bryant said he would like to "set an earlier timetable, but I just don't want to over-promise and under-deliver" [3]. That is a defensible reason not to promise a date too early. It is not a reason the 4 November statement, written after that caution had already been aired in public, could not have repeated the same outer limit its own minister had already given.

The claims, tested

The claim What the record shows Verdict
"We found the UK's current framework for preventing forced labour to be fragmented" [1], fixed by this package The fix applies one regime in Great Britain and a different one, the EU's, in Northern Ireland, asserted to have "a similar effect in practice" with no comparison shown [1] Fragmentation by voluntary-versus-mandatory becomes fragmentation by jurisdiction; the statement does not reconcile the two
"A regulator will be empowered to investigate businesses suspected of placing such goods on the market" [1] No regulator is named in the statement; the Trade Strategy's own candidate, the Office for Responsible Business Conduct, is not mentioned [2] A new enforcement power with no named enforcer
"Introduce them as soon as parliamentary time allows" [1], no date given The Minister of State for Trade had already named an outer limit, the end of this Parliament, four months before this statement [3] The government's own public record already contained the marker this statement omits

The mistakes, counted

A fragmentation diagnosis answered with a second fragmentation (1). The statement's own reasoning starts from the finding that the current approach is "fragmented and overly reliant on voluntary action" [1]. Its remedy is a Great Britain regime and a Northern Ireland regime, run under two different legal frameworks, declared equivalent in one unsupported clause [1].

A headline enforcement power with no enforcer named (2). "A regulator will be empowered" to pull forced-labour goods from the market [1] is the statement's most concrete new power. It is also its vaguest subject: not the Office for Responsible Business Conduct the Trade Strategy had already promised to build for this purpose [2], not any other named body, just "a regulator."

A date withheld that the government had already given itself (3). "As soon as parliamentary time allows" [1] reads as open-ended only if the reader has not seen the Business and Trade Committee's transcript from four months earlier, where the minister responsible for this exact policy put an outer limit on it in his own words [3].

Credit where due

The package is not cosmetic. A power to direct the withdrawal of forced-labour goods from the market is a real addition to a regime that, by the statement's own account, has so far relied on section 54 of the Modern Slavery Act's voluntary supply-chain statements [1]. The £350 million turnover threshold is a specific, checkable number, not a vague promise to catch "large businesses" at some later date [1]. Northern Ireland is not left without any mechanism at all: applying the existing EU Forced Labour Regulation under the Windsor Framework there, rather than waiting for a UK-wide answer, closes a gap that could otherwise have sat open indefinitely [1]. And the case for the policy is not invented for effect: the government's own Trade Strategy cites the International Labour Organization's estimate that ending forced labour globally could add US$611 billion to global GDP [2], a stake the statement is at least trying to act on, however loosely specified the mechanism.

Verdict

Four stars, from three documented mistakes. The policy direction is defensible and the new power is real. What is missing is the apparatus that would let anyone outside government check whether it is working: a named regulator to use the power, a reconciled account of why one country runs two different versions of the same fix, and a date that matches what the government's own minister had already said in public four months earlier. A statement reporting the outcome of a review that began with a diagnosis of fragmentation should not read, on its own terms, like a second kind of fragmentation.

Sources

  1. Responsible Business Conduct: written ministerial statement (HCWS454), Jonathan Reynolds, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade, 4 November 2026. (The page returns a bot block to automated fetchers; the full text was independently verified via UK Parliament's own public Written Questions and Statements API.)
  2. The UK's Trade Strategy (CP1339), Department for Business and Trade, June 2025, pp.87-88.
  3. UK Official Aiming for Forced Labor Import Ban Within 3 Years, Export Compliance Daily, 1 July 2026, reporting Chris Bryant's evidence to the Business and Trade Committee, 30 June 2026.
SHARE THIS ARTICLEXBlueskyMastodonLinkedInRedditEmail