The audit regulator fined Saffery and the partner who signed off its audit of Greensill Capital, and says their failures did not cause its collapse. The going-concern sign-off leaned on a government Covid loan guarantee that had not even been approved.
Estimated reading time: 6 minutes
In short. On 16 November 2026 the Financial Reporting Council's Executive Counsel fined Saffery LLP £581,250 and audit engagement partner Michael Di Leto £124,000 over 23 admitted breaches in their 2019 audit of Greensill Capital (UK) Ltd, the firm that collapsed into administration in March 2021 [1]. The Final Settlement Decision Notice states twice that "Executive Counsel does not suggest that such breaches caused the insolvent administration of GCUK" [2]. Its own findings sit less comfortably next to that line than the line suggests: the going-concern sign-off accepted, as reassurance, GCUK's application to a UK government Covid-19 loan guarantee scheme worth close to £3 billion, an application that had not yet succeeded and that the notice's own reasoning says should have been discounted [2]. Separately, the audit proceeded without a second reviewer that Saffery's own risk-rating software said the file required. Two documented mistakes: four stars.
Greensill Capital (UK) Ltd, GCUK, was the main trading company of an Australian-headquartered finance group that lent against invoices, known as supply chain finance. By the end of 2019 it was owed about $18 billion, financed mostly by three outside investors who bought the right to be repaid [2]. When the trade credit insurance that made those receivables marketable lapsed in early 2021 and was not renewed, the investors pulled out, GCUK stopped writing new business on 2 March 2021, and entered administration six days later, on 8 March [2]. The administration, the FRC notes, "remains ongoing" [2].
The claims, tested
| The document's own words | What the notice actually sets out | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| "Notwithstanding the fact that the Respondents' audit work regarding the assessment of going concern breached Relevant Requirements... Executive Counsel does not suggest that such breaches caused the insolvent administration of GCUK" (para 387, repeated at para 526) [2] | The going-concern sign-off accepted GCUK's claim that funding capacity was secure partly because of "a UK Government (Covid-19 related) scheme they had applied for totalling c£3 billion" (para 415.1), even though "the application had not yet been successful, which should have led the Respondents to discount it as a factor" (para 419.3a) [2]. The clean audit opinion was signed on 26 May 2020; GCUK entered administration "only ten months" later, on the FRC's own count (para 528.1) [2] | The disclaimer draws a clean legal line between breach and cause. The notice's own sequencing, and its own finding that the sign-off leaned on exactly the kind of funding dependency that later failed, sit uneasily beside that line |
| "Mr Di Leto, as the engagement partner, was required to determine that an EQCR had been appointed" (para 99) [2] | Saffery's own CCH planning software rated the audit "high" inherent risk, which "under Saffery's own policies and procedures" meant "an EQCR should have been appointed" (para 107). "No EQCR was appointed for the FY2019 Audit" (para 99) [2] | Not a judgement call. The firm's own system flagged the file as needing a second reviewer before the audit report could even be dated, and nobody acted on it |
A government guarantee that had not yet arrived
The going-concern section of the notice runs to 35 paragraphs, and its central problem is simple: GCUK's ability to keep trading depended on a small number of investors continuing to buy its receivables, and the Respondents' working papers accepted, with almost no independent testing, GCUK's own assurance that this would continue [2]. Part of that assurance was the prospect of money from the Covid Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme, CLBILS, which GCUK had applied to join in April 2020 [2]. The notice is specific about why that should never have counted as comfort: "the aspect of the scheme that GCUK applied for did not provide funds, it merely provided a guarantee in the event of default by the borrower," and in any case "the application had not yet been successful" (para 419.3a) [2]. A second plank, German government-guaranteed insurance said to cover the investors' exposure, was accepted the same way: "simply an assertion from GCUK which the Respondents appear to have accepted without independent consideration or review" (para 419.3b) [2].
The notice records the Respondents' own working-paper conclusion, from a single phone call with GCUK management: "Considering the strong performance of the company there is no indication that the funding capacity would be deceased [sic]" (para 416) [2]. Within a year, funding capacity was not merely decreased. It stopped.
Two documents, two levels of scrutiny
The FRC is careful throughout to separate the question it is answering, whether Saffery and Mr Di Leto breached audit standards, from a question it says it is not answering, whether those breaches caused GCUK's collapse [2]. That is a legitimate and legally cautious distinction: an audit failure and a company's commercial collapse are not the same finding, and the notice is right not to conflate them formally. What the notice does not do is explain why the specific failure it documents, waving through an untested, unapproved government funding backstop as evidence that money would keep flowing, is different in kind from the funding withdrawal that actually ended GCUK ten months later. The notice states the sequence itself, at paragraph 528.1, without drawing the connection its own readers are left to draw.
Credit where due
The notice is thorough where it did not have to be. Ninety-five pages, 23 specifically admitted breaches, and a sanction structure that discloses its own maths, a 22.5 percent reduction for Saffery and Mr Di Leto's admissions and early disposal, both stated in full [1]. The FRC also declines to overreach: it does not claim the audit caused the collapse, and it records, fairly, that Saffery has since changed its audit methodology and that Mr Di Leto has taken some remedial steps, albeit unassessed for effectiveness (para 525 area) [2]. The order attached to the sanction requires both to demonstrate those changes actually work, not merely that they were made.
Verdict
Four stars, from two documented mistakes. The FRC did the work: it reconstructed a complex, year-old audit file in detail and extracted admissions most regulators would have settled for in outline. The two gaps are real but narrow. First, the notice's repeated insistence that the breaches "did not cause" the collapse is stated beside, not reconciled with, its own finding that the going-concern sign-off rested on an unapproved government guarantee the notice itself says should have carried no weight. Second, the audit went ahead without the second reviewer Saffery's own risk system said the file needed, a failure the notice records as fact rather than judgement.
The star score counts two documented mistakes: first, the notice's causation disclaimer (paras 387 and 526) is placed beside, but not tested against, its own finding (para 419.3a) that the going-concern sign-off accepted an unapproved government loan guarantee application as reassurance, with the clean audit opinion preceding the collapse by ten months on the notice's own count (para 528.1); second, Saffery's own CCH software rated the audit "high" inherent risk, which under the firm's own policy required an Engagement Quality Control Reviewer, and none was appointed (paras 99, 107). Two falls in the 1 to 3 band: four stars; the bands are on the ratings page. This piece makes no finding that Saffery LLP or Mr Di Leto acted dishonestly, or that their audit caused Greensill Capital's collapse; both have admitted the breaches described and accepted the sanctions as part of a settlement, and the FRC's own notice is the source for every figure and quotation here. Both sources below were fetched directly on 19 November 2026 and returned HTTP 200.
Sources
- Sanctions against Saffery LLP and Mr Michael Di Leto, Financial Reporting Council, published 16 November 2026
- Executive Counsel's Final Settlement Decision Notice: Saffery LLP and Mr Michael Di Leto, Financial Reporting Council, 16 November 2026