Treasury calls a six-year time limit on unfair credit claims settled law since 2007. A court found in September there is no limit at all, and the change takes force before the bill that makes it law reaches committee.
Estimated reading time: 6 minutes
In short. HM Treasury's technical note says a six-year limit on claims under section 140B of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 "has been commonly understood" since 2007 and that the Supreme Court "took this as the basis" for its 2023 ruling in Smith v RBS [1]. Smith v RBS itself records that position as something neither side disputed, never something the court decided [2], and a County Court ruling four months ago tested it directly and found no statutory limit applies at all [3]. The change took effect today, 18 November 2026; the bill meant to put it into law has not yet reached committee stage [4]. Two documented mistakes: four stars.
Section 140B of the Consumer Credit Act lets a court unwind a credit agreement it finds unfair to the borrower, from an undisclosed commission on a car loan to a punitive overdraft term. For nearly two decades, lenders and claimants alike have treated a six-year clock as part of the deal. HM Treasury's technical note, published 17 November 2026, says it is merely writing that clock into statute "to avoid a prolonged period of uncertainty for consumers and industry" [1]. The document it names as the clock's origin says something narrower, and the court case it declines to name says something close to the opposite.
The claims, tested
| The technical note's own words | What the record shows | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| "Since section 140B was introduced in 2007, it has been commonly understood that this is the legal position, in line with the Limitation Act 1980. The Supreme Court took this as the basis for its judgement in the 2023 Smith v RBS case" [1] | Smith v RBS itself states, at paragraph 31: "It is common ground that this is the applicable limitation period in the present cases. The dispute is about when 'the cause of action accrued'" [2] - both banks and claimants simply agreed the six-year period applied; the Supreme Court never had to decide whether it did | The "basis" the note cites was an unopposed assumption the parties walked in with, not a ruling on the point now in dispute |
| "...but some recent court cases have caused uncertainty" [1] | Berry v Black Horse Ltd [2026] EWCC 54, handed down 1 September 2026, directly tested the assumption and held at paragraph 71 that claims under section 140A "are not in my judgment governed by the provisions of the 1980 Act"; the appeal was allowed and remitted, with the judge recording at paragraph 74 that both sides intend to appeal further and hoping the Court of Appeal gives the issue "authoritative treatment at an early date" [3] | "Uncertainty" understates a judgment that rejected the assumption outright and is itself still live, pending a higher court |
| The amendment "applies to any claim that is brought on or after 18 November 2026, regardless of when the cause of action for that claim accrued" [1] | The Financial Services and Markets Bill, the only vehicle named for this amendment, is at Commons committee stage with sittings scheduled for 24 and 26 November 2026; it has not been enacted and the amendment itself has not yet been tabled [4] | A cutoff date was announced and takes effect for a change that, on the day it starts, Parliament has not yet voted on |
What Smith v RBS actually settled, and what it did not
Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc concerned two customers mis-sold payment protection insurance, who sued years after their PPI payments ended but within six years of their credit card agreements closing [2]. The Supreme Court, handed down 4 October 2023, ruled in the customers' favour on the only question argued: that the clock runs from when the credit relationship ends, not from the date of each payment [2]. Whether a six-year clock applied at all was not argued, because the bank's own defence relied on it. Lord Leggatt, who wrote the lead judgment, flagged the gap himself in the same ruling: the section 140A-C regime "is not unique in treating the consequence of delay in bringing proceedings as a matter governed partly or even wholly by an exercise of judicial discretion rather than a statutory time limit. There are some types of claim which are not subject to any statutory period of limitation at all" (paragraph 58) [2]. Treasury's note cites the judgment that contains that sentence as having settled the opposite question.
The ruling Treasury does not name
Christopher Berry bought a Volkswagen Golf on hire purchase from Black Horse Ltd in June 2005, financed through a dealer who was paid commission he was never told about [3]. He settled the loan in 2007 and sued in 2023, long after any six-year clock measured from the agreement's end would have run out. His appeal, heard 8 July 2026 by His Honour Judge Glen and reserved because, in the judge's words, it raised "a point of profound significance" (paragraph 3), argued a single ground: that the Limitation Act 1980 does not prescribe any time limit for section 140A-C claims at all [3]. The judge agreed. Drawing on the Supreme Court's own 2026 ruling in THG plc v Zedra, which found unfair-prejudice petitions under company law carry no statutory limitation period either, he held that claims of this kind "are not in my judgment governed by the provisions of the 1980 Act. Instead, the control mechanism for claims that are stale lies in the breadth of the court's discretion" (paragraph 71) [3]. He was explicit that a widely held assumption is not the same as a decided question: "A settled understanding of the law clearly carries some weight but it is not decisive," quoting the Supreme Court's own line that "a settled practice, or widespread belief, is not the same as an authoritative decision on the meaning of provisions of the 1980 Act" (paragraph 61) [3]. He allowed the appeal and remitted the case, and recorded that neither side hid its intention to appeal further, "given the potential ramifications," adding that he would have granted permission to appeal himself had the rules let him (paragraph 74) [3]. Treasury's technical note never names Berry. It is, on the dates involved, the only candidate for the "recent court cases" it cites as the reason to legislate.
A deadline for a law that is not one yet
Section 140A-C claims are not a niche corner of consumer law. They are the same provision behind the undisclosed-commission litigation that produced Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2025] UKSC 33, cited in Berry's own judgment, and the wider motor finance mis-selling dispute this site has already covered: an FCA scheme covering an estimated 12.1 million agreements and a headline figure Treasury's note does not mention at all, somewhere between 7.5 billion and 10 billion pounds on the regulator's own two inconsistent public figures [5]. Berry's ruling, if it survives an appeal, would mean some of those claims are not time-barred at all. Treasury's note closes that door for anyone who had not already filed a court claim before today: "Where a claim has been submitted to the courts before 18 November 2026, these may continue under existing legislation" [1]. Anyone who had not sued by close of business yesterday loses the benefit of Berry's reasoning from today, regardless of how the Court of Appeal eventually rules on it.
The vehicle for the change is named in the note itself: "The Government will be introducing an amendment to the Financial Services and Markets Bill" [1]. That bill had its Commons second reading on 10 November 2026 and is listed, as of this check, at committee stage with sittings on 24 and 26 November, still to come; it has not received royal assent, and no amendment on this point has yet been tabled [4]. The technical note nonetheless fixes 18 November 2026, today, as the date from which the new rule governs any claim brought. A government can announce what it intends to legislate. It cannot make that intention law before Parliament passes it, and the note does not explain what happens if the committee, the Commons or the Lords change or reject the amendment it has already dated.
Credit where due
Treasury's note is not evasive about the mechanics of its own cutoff: the 18 November date, the carve-out for claims already filed, and the amendment's target legislation are all stated plainly, in four short paragraphs, rather than buried in a schedule. It is also honest that the change is a policy choice to end uncertainty rather than a neutral restatement, since it says so directly: the aim is "to avoid a prolonged period of uncertainty for consumers and industry while cases work their way through the courts" [1]. And the note's substance, that six years from the end of the credit relationship is a reasonable rule, is not unreasonable on its face; it is the rule nearly every court applying section 140B before Berry assumed was already there. The problem is not the position Treasury wants. It is the claim that the position was already settled, made the day before the position stopped being settled anywhere but in a government policy paper.
The star score counts two documented mistakes: first, the technical note cites the 2023 Smith v RBS judgment as the basis for a six-year limitation rule that judgment's own text, at paragraph 31, records as common ground between the parties rather than a decided question, while its author, in the same judgment at paragraph 58, flagged that no fixed statutory limit might apply at all; second, the note fixes a legal cutoff date of 18 November 2026 for an amendment to the Financial Services and Markets Bill that, independently verified against the bill's own parliamentary stage, had not been tabled, debated or passed as of that date. Two mistakes in the 1-to-3 band: four stars; the bands are on the ratings page. This piece takes no position on whether Berry v Black Horse Ltd is correctly decided, a question the Court of Appeal has not yet addressed; it reports what the Supreme Court judgment Treasury cites actually says, and what the bill Treasury names as its vehicle has actually done. All sources below were fetched directly on 18 November 2026 and returned HTTP 200, except source 4, which returns HTTP 403 to automated requests (a known block on bills.parliament.uk's own HTML pages) and was independently verified live via the official bills-api.parliament.uk JSON endpoint.
Sources
- Clarifying limitation periods in the Consumer Credit Act 1974, HM Treasury, published 17 November 2026
- Smith and another v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2023] UKSC 34, UK Supreme Court, handed down 4 October 2023
- Christopher Berry v Black Horse Ltd [2026] EWCC 54, County Court (Birmingham), handed down 1 September 2026
- Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]: stages, UK Parliament
- Car finance complaints, Financial Conduct Authority